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Abstract
Pandemic, zoonotic and seasonal influenza viruses remain a threat to humans, and have major health and economic impacts globally. The 
pandemic threat due to Influenza A (H5N1) still exists since the virus is still endemic in poultry population in some countries. Sporadic 
cases of influenza A (H5N1) in humans are regularly reported. Efforts made by the animal sector to reduce circulation in poultry have 
contributed in reducing the risk of human H5N1 infection in many parts of the world. On 25 April 2009, Mexico, under the International 
Health Regulations (2005), notified the World Health Organization (WHO) about an outbreak of new influenza virus, which was 
characterized as a H1N1 virus previously not found in human. In less than nine weeks, the pandemic virus spread in the six WHO regions. 
On 11 June 2009, WHO announced a phase 6 pandemic alert. Thanks to the preparedness efforts carried out in a large number of 
countries in the world in response to influenza A (H5N1) threats, the international community has responded quite well to the pandemic. 
In particular, countries have been especially collaborative regarding the exchange of information and the global approach of access to 
supplies such as vaccine and antiviral drugs. The current pandemic presents significant differences to seasonal influenza epidemics and 
specific challenges are identified. 
¤ 2010 World Health Organization.  All rights reserved. The World Health Organization has granted the publisher permission to reproduce this article. 
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1. Introduction  
Influenza, in its pandemic, zoonotic and seasonal forms, remains a threat to humans, and has major health and economic 
impacts globally. Influenza pandemics occur when a new strain of the virus emerges and is transmitted rapidly among 
humans. A likely source of pandemic viruses is other animal species such as pigs, chickens and ducks. Within the last two 
decades, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses including H5N1 and H7N7, have circulated in poultry and 
caused human infections in several regions around the world. The HPAI H5N1 virus has also exacted a heavy toll on the 
poultry industry and national economies of affected countries since its initial emergence in 1997 and subsequent extensive 
geographical spread. The potential of such animal viruses to evolve into pandemic viruses is of particular concern to health 
authorities and the World Health Organization. The recent emergence of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus is a good example. 
The genetic constellation of the virus indicated its origin from swine and consists of genetic material from swine, avian and 
human influenza viruses. Since its initial detection in April 2009, the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus has spread quickly 
throughout the world causing death especially for those who are at risk of severe infection.
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2. Global threat from avian influenza viruses
2.1 Epidemiology of human infection with avian influenza H5N1 
The HPAI H5N1 virus remains an important threat to human health in many regions of the world. The number of cases of 
H5N1 infection in humans as reported from February 2003 to November 2009 amounts to 444 cases with 262 fatal 
outcomes. Infection occurred in humans in 15 countries with a high overall case fatality rate reaching 61.5%. The first 
human case of H5N1 infection was reported from Hong Kong in 1997 and associated with a subsequent outbreak involving 
18 cases. As shown in Figure 1, the spread of H5N1 infection in humans after the 1997 outbreak has been concentrated in 
South East Asia and Egypt. Countries with high case numbers of confirmed H5N1 human infection included Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Egypt, China and Thailand. In some of these countries, human infections have continued to occur [1]. The 
monthly incidence of human H5N1 cases around the world is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 1.  Areas of the world with confirmed human cases of H5N1 avian influenza infection from February
2003 to November 2009.
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Figure 2. Number of confirmed human H5N1 cases by month of onset prior to 01 December 2009.
The highest number of cases was reported in January 2004 from Vietnam and Thailand. These two countries remained the 
focal points of H5N1 activity for the first 20 months of monitoring. Other countries such as Cambodia and Indonesia began 
to report human infection as the virus spreads in the region [2]. Beginning in September 2005, the virus spread to countries 
outside Asia such as Turkey, Egypt and other countries in the Middle East and northern Africa. During the last 12 months, 
the majority of cases were reported from Indonesia and Egypt. 
2.2 Control measures at the human-animal interface 
Zoonotic and pandemic threats from H5N1 still exist, because the virus has become endemic in poultry in some countries, 
in particular Indonesia and Egypt. There appears to be an association between endemic circulation of the virus in poultry 
and continued human infection, and sporadic cases of H5N1 infection in human will likely to occur as long as the virus 
continues to circulate widely among poultry [3]. Thus, the primary strategy to limit human infection with avian influenza 
viruses is to control the virus at source, in the poultry populations. Preliminary results from assessments of the public health
impact of reducing poultry infection (Figure 3) showed that changes in the number of new countries reporting human H5N1 
infection showed a corresponding increase or decrease as the number of new countries reporting outbreaks in birds is 
increased or decreased. A similar relationship is seen between the total number of countries reporting human infection and 
the total number countries reporting H5N1 outbreaks in birds, indicating that effective control of H5N1 infection in poultry 
populations reduce the risk of human infection. This was also illustrated by the application of control measures subsequent 
to the outbreak of H5N1 infections in Hong Kong 1997. Public health policies were enacted aiming at liming the spread of 
H5N1 virus in poultries (including culling of all poultries and controlling imports) and their contact with humans together 
with a vigorous surveillance program in place for both poultries and human had been effective in containing further 
outbreaks
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Figure 3. The apparent association between the number of human cases (new and total) and outbreaks in poultry 
prior to 02 December 2009.
2.3 Assessment of the pandemic risk from avian influenza viruses  
The risk that an avian influenza virus could emerge as the next pandemic virus continues to be an important aspect in global 
influenza pandemic planning as long as avian viruses circulate in poultry and lead to human exposure [4]. Many questions 
concerning pandemic risk from animal viruses remain to be answered [5]. One important facet of the ecology and evolution 
of pandemic viruses lies in the ability of the different influenza viruses to reassort while replication occurs within the same
host. Experts consider that the reassortment of H5N1 virus with circulating human viruses (such as the current pandemic 
H1N1 virus) or other animal viruses is possible, but the likelihood is unclear. Also unclear are the whether reassorted virus 
would maintain infectivity in humans. Likewise, the pathogenicity and transmissibility of a reassortant virus cannot be 
predicted. Public health authorities and international organizations such as FAO, OIE and WHO are tracking and 
monitoring virus circulation and are continuously engaged in monitoring and characterization of emerging viruses. Other 
influenza subtypes (e.g. H1, H2, H3, H5, H7 and H9) circulate in poultry and other animal populations and  pose potential 
zoonotic and pandemic risks. In addition to H5N1 viruses, avian H7N7 and H9N2 viruses have been associated with human 
infection. An outbreak of H7N7 in poultry led to many human infections and one fatal outcome in a veterinarian, and 
several cases of clinically mild avian H9N2 infections in humans have been reported from Southern China. 
2.4 Reducing the impact of avian influenza H5N1 virus infection in humans 
Although the total number of avian influenza H5N1 infection in humans remains low as compared to those reported during 
seasonal outbreaks of influenza, the impact to public health and society remains high,. As discussed earlier, the case fatality
rate of H5N1 infections in humans in different countries has persistently been higher than for either seasonal influenza or 
past pandemics. To reduce the mortality rate in infected patients, improvements in individual case outcomes are possible. 
One example of this is in Egypt where endemic circulation and ongoing reports of poultry outbreaks showed additional 
seasonal increases in incidence of both poultry outbreaks and human cases in many governorates, especially in the Nile 
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Delta region. To date, 89 confirmed human cases with 27 deaths have been reported from Egypt. The mean age of those 
affected is 15 years (vs. 21 years globally), and most cases have reported exposure to poultry or contaminated environments. 
However, the overall case fatality rate in Egypt is relatively low at 36.5 as compared to 61.5 globally, and appears to be 
decreasing as the outbreak continues. The reasons for the apparent reduction in case fatality rate are not known: It may be 
the result of the seeking for early health care for children infected, surveillance bias or a relative lower severity of the 
circulating viral clade. 
3. Pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 
On 25April 2009, Mexico, under the 2005 International Health Regulations, notified WHO about an outbreak of influenza-
like illness [6]. The responsible virus was identified a few days later by a WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and 
Research on Influenza and a reference laboratory in Canada. This was the first reported event related to Influenza A (H1N1) 
2009 [7]. In less than nine weeks, the pandemic virus spread in the six WHO regions. On 11 June 2009, WHO announced a 
phase 6 pandemic alert [8, 9].  
3.1 Epidemiology and clinical presentation of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection 
Pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 is similar in many ways to seasonal influenza, but has a number of different 
characteristics particularly during the early phase of the pandemic [10]. Among these are: the existence of gastrointestinal 
symptoms in up to 50% of all reported cases; severe forms of the disease in young, healthy adults with no recognizable 
underlying risk factors; the particular vulnerability of certain groups of individuals at risk for severe or progressive illness
following infection [11]. Patients at risk of severe influenza disease include pregnant women, patients with chronic 
respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, immunosuppression, and possibly obesity. The majority of cases are mild, 
but between 2 to 10 % of the cases required hospitalization, especially in children under 5 years old [12]. Older teens and 
young adults have had the highest attack rates, with the median age at 12-28 years. Children less than 5 years have the 
highest rates of hospitalization which is at least twice of that in other age groups. Mortality from illness is highest in the 50 - 
60 years old group with median values of 35 to 51 years according to reports from different regions. Some (approximately 
20 - 40%) previously young healthy adults developed acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) with fatal outcomes.  
While the pandemic is spreading rapidly around the world, it remains difficult to assess the proportion of patients whom 
may develop severe or fatal illness due to the variations in defining underlying condition as risk factors associated with 
severe outcomes. There is also a predominance of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus over other seasonal influenza strains as 
observed during the outbreaks in the southern hemisphere between June and September.
The (H1N1) 2009 pandemic was the first major global influenza alert issued under the 2005 International Health 
Regulations (IHR) – an international legal framework for public health actions of WHO and its member states to prevent, 
control and respond to the international spread of diseases. The IHR introduced new operational concepts in the event of a 
pandemic which include: specific procedures for disease surveillance, notification and reporting of public health events and 
associated risks to WHO by countries; requests by WHO for verification of public health events occurring within countries; 
rapid collaborative risk assessment with and assistance to countries; determinations as to whether an event constitutes a 
public health emergency of international concern; and lastly coordination of international response.  
As of 5 December 2009, data collected from continuous disease surveillance by WHO on the progression of the pandemic 
(Figure 4) lead to the estimation that likely every country of the world is infected. The total number of cases globally may 
reach millions of individuals. 
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Figure 4. Countries, territories and areas with laboratory confirmed cases and number of deaths associated with 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection as reported to WHO as of 04 October 2009.  
3.2 Burden of pandemic A (H1N1) on the health care system 
Based on the limited information available at this point, the pandemic showed higher than normal rates of outpatient visits 
as observed in many places. There is no uniformed observation on the rate of outpatient visits during the pandemic, 
however in New Zealand, the rate for such clinic visits was three times that of a "normal" epidemic year. It is not possible at
this point to assess how much of the increase in demand for medical attention is due to public concern – the "worried well".  
Hospital admissions since the start of the pandemic had not been excessive, but continued to be high in specific age groups 
such as infants and young children. Severe ARDS in infected patients requiring mechanical ventilator support has also been 
increasing to a level of 4 to 15 times of that observed in normal influenza seasons for 4 to 8 weeks. Longer duration of 
hospitalization has also been observed in severely affected patients. 
4. Lessons learned and future challenges for pandemic (H1N1) 2009  
The global challenges presented by the current (H1N1) 2009 pandemic are multifaceted [13]. While the disease 
presentations are similar to seasonal influenza, specific features associated with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 such as the rapid 
progression to severe disease or deaths in young healthy adults posted significant impact on health care systems in affected 
areas. Increasing evidence also showed that the majority of fatal pandemic (H1N1) infections were in patients presented 
with underlying medical conditions. Patient management and treatment are becoming more complex. It is important to 
monitor the progression of the pandemic and the changes in characteristics, such as the identification of possible 
reassortment with other influenza viruses; genetic markers for enhanced viral virulence and the growing concerns relating to 
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the development of resistance to antiviral treatment. This monitoring requires the maintenance of an extensive network of 
laboratories, global experts and country-specific infrastructures [14, 15]. Providing recommendations for vaccine 
composition has been an important task taken up by the WHO. The recommendation for vaccine composition in the current 
(H1N1) 2009 pandemic has been particularly difficult due to the predominance of the pandemic virus over the other 
seasonal viruses and the assessment on the importance of the seasonal viruses in future epidemics remain difficult to predict. 
The demand for rapid development and distribution of specific vaccines for pandemic control [16] is limited by the ability 
of manufacturers to produce the vaccine in a relatively short time frame and in quantities sufficient for global distribution. 
The need for rapid and accurate communication among public health decision makers and the public is forever growing as 
the pandemic progresses. The challenge of risk communication during pandemic is due to globalization of communication 
and the multiplication of communication channels (internet blogs, news papers, television programs and scientific press) 
which may lead to multiple messages with a higher risk of misinterpretation and rumor spreading.
The ability to mitigate these challenges lies in the functioning of global mechanisms for rapid detection and response as 
outlined in the International Health Regulations. Evidence showed that the rapid reporting and response of the different 
sectors in the health systems around the world had been encouraging. The extensive activities instituted for pandemic 
preparedness around the world prior to the pandemic has been most helpful in mitigating challenges presented by the 
pandemic.  
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